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Intelligent Design (ID) is advanced by its proponents as being a scientific research program. ID holds that: ‘intelligent agency, as an aspect of scientific theory making, has more explanatory power in accounting for the specified, and sometimes irreducible complexity of some physical systems, including biological entities, and/or the existence of the universe as a whole, than the blind forces of. . . matter.’ That is, intelligent design is hypothesised as being a better explanation for entities exhibiting complex specified information (CSI) than are appeals to the inherent capacities of nature (i.e. chance and/or physical necessity). ID suggests that the world contains objects that exhaust the explanatory resources of undirected natural causes, and can only be adequately explained by recourse to intelligent causation. Design theorists have claimed that intelligent design can be inferred from such facets of reality as:
Some opponents of ID dismiss it as being bad science (they suggest ID lacks evidence, or has even been falsified), while others dismiss it as not being science at all. Of course, both criticisms can’t be correct. ID can’t be bad science unless it is science. Before ID can be criticised as being ‘bad’ science, the issue of whether or not ID is science has to be settled.
In a recent Skeptical Inquirer article, ‘Why SETI IS Science and UFOlogy Is Not: A Space Science Perspective on Boundaries’ (Volume 28, No. 6, November/December 2004, p. 40-42), Mark Moldwin (Associate Professor of Space Physics in the Earth and Space Sciences Department and the Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics, the University of California, Los Angeles) argues that SETI (the search for extra-terrestrial intelligence) is science and UFOlogy is not. While I will pass some comments on Moldwin’s attempt to distinguish science from pseudoscience, my primary aim will be to assess Intelligent Design Theory using Moldwin’s criteria. In other words, I will seek to answer this question: ‘Given Moldwin’s criteria for distinguishing between science and pseudoscience, is ID science or pseudoscience?’
One of the goals of science education, writes Moldwin: ‘is to provide critical thinking skills that are necessary to distinguish fact from fallacy, legitimacy from fraud, and science from pseudoscience.’ However: ‘To the discomfort of many’ says Moldwin, the line between science and pseudoscience ‘can be fuzzy. Like the old saying about pornography, rational thinkers like to believe they know pseudoscience when they see it.’
Moldwin quickly dismisses the thought that ‘science follows the scientific method. . . whereas pseudoscience does not’, noting that ‘This is clearly not the case. . . since many pseudoscientific claims are routinely put to the scientific method test, and debates rage on the results of studies that purport pseudoscientific claims published in the scientific literature. . .’
If science is not defined by the scientific method, then how are we to distinguish between science and pseudoscience? Moldwin suggests: ‘two characteristics of science that can be used to make that distinction.’ The first characteristic concerns the community of scientists, and the second characteristic concerns what Moldwin calls the ‘essence of science’, namely ‘the constant testing of any scientific idea against reality.’
According to Moldwin, the willingness of scientists to practice as part of the community of science means: ‘having the appropriate educational credentials, undergoing peer review of proposed scientific ideas, discussing ideas at scientific meetings and conferences, and presenting results for peer review in respected journals’; it means not avoiding ‘a critical assessment of their ideas’ or ‘the constant testing of scientific ideas compared to previous understanding and observations.’ It is this testing against reality, or ‘reality therapy’, that Moldwin says defines the ‘essence of science.’
Applying these characteristic criteria of science to SETI and UFOlogy, Moldwin argues that SETI qualifies as scientific but UFOlogy does not. Moldwin observes that SETI has been recognized by NASA, has had peer reviewed journal articles published and builds upon the premise that: ‘life may have evolved elsewhere in the universe and some of that life may be intelligent enough to utilize electromagnetic radiation as a form of communication.’ The search for UFO’s, on the other hand, ‘is derided as pseudoscience, even though UFOlogists may consistently practice according to the scientific method. . . and share a similar premise with SETI researchers’ because ‘UFOlogy is not part of the community of astronomy, astrobiology, or any other discipline, and its methodology, no matter how scientifically rigorous, will lead to no useful scientific results except in the singular case of the discovery of an alien spacecraft.’ SETI, on the other hand, is ‘part of the community of astronomy or astrobiology and is practiced by astronomers, physicists, and geophysicists. The methodology of SETI leads to useful scientific results even in the absence of discovery of alien life. In fact, the stated mission of the SETI institute is “to explore, understand, and explain the origin, nature, and prevalence of life in the universe.” A broad goal not predicated on the existence of intelligent life in the universe.’
Moldwin makes a further ‘fuzzy’ distinction, between ‘textbook’ science (science that has stood the test of time and has been subjected to repeated ‘reality therapy’) and ‘frontier’ science (science which makes the cover of the New York Times but is frequently wrong): ‘SETI began as frontier science’, but some of its hypotheses (e.g. that there are other solar systems of planets) have been verified: ‘So when one looks at the difference between SETI and UFOlogy, the two main differences are that SETI operates within the community of science whereas UFOlogy does not and that several SETI ideas have been explored observationally and validated.’ This said, Moldwin notes that: ‘if an alien craft landed on Earth tomorrow, UFOlogy would instantly join the mainstream. Therefore, the boundary between pseudoscience and science is not necessarily immutable.’
Moldwin concludes that:
In trying to clearly differentiate between science and pseudoscience, one often needs to go beyond each field’s methodology and look more closely at its sociology and the willingness of its practitioners to constantly compare and test their ideas against our current understanding and observations. Do they allow their work to be scrutinized and criticized by their scientific collegues? Do they publish in peer-reviewed scientific journals? Have any advances in their field made it into scientific textbooks? The answers to these three questions are often good indicators of whether an area of study belongs in the realm of science or pseudoscience.
Moldwin’s sociological criteria of demarcation means that whether or not a theory or research programme is ‘scientific’ depends, in part, upon its acceptance by scientists. Scientists are presumably people qualified in some branch or other of science (and perhaps who publish peer-reviewed papers in recognized scientific journals), something that threatens this criterion with circularity, as what counts as a branch of science (or a scientific journal) would depend, in part, upon the acceptance of scientists! Moreover, what scientists are prepared to accept as being science depends, in part at least, upon what philosophical assumptions they make. Scientists with different worldviews might therefore disagree about whether or not a given theory is scientific. Finally, as the dominant worldview of the community of scientists changes over time, so what theories they will be prepared to count as being scientific might change over time as well. In other words, Moldwin’s sociological criterion makes the scientific status of theories and research programmes partly dependent upon the culture, worldview, time and place at which they are considered.
Of course, Moldwin’s sociological criteria is not the only characteristic of science he advances. There is the second, ‘reality therapy’ criterion. However, at first glance this criterion appears to co-inside with the adoption of the ‘scientific method’, a method that he earlier rejects as a sufficient condition of scientific standing. Perhaps Moldwin means to retain scientific method as a necessary condition of being scientific; his emphasis does seem to be on the scientific status of theories that have some observational verification (‘several SETI ideas have been explored observationally and validated.’) The problem for UFOlogy here is presumably that its purported observational verifications (eye-witness reports, photographs and video tapes of objects in the sky, etc) are open to alternative and simpler adequate explanations, such as: mistaken identity of secret military aircraft or atmospheric phenomena, individual hallucination, or even hoaxes. However, although I don’t believe in the existence of alien spacecraft myself, I suppose that reasonable, scientifically qualified inquirers can differ as to the best interpretation of the relevant evidence, and as to whether the existence of alien spacecraft mightn’t be the best explanation of that evidence. Of course, how one interprets the evidence for UFO’s depends in part upon what presuppositions one brings to the table. For example, someone who is convinced of the ‘Rare Earth’ hypothesis will be skeptical about the existence of alien spacecraft a priori, and so will demand a higher standard of empirical proof than someone who believes that alien civilizations abound. Verifying a theory is not necessarily as straight forward a matter as simply looking at the evidence. Moreover, two competing theories can each have evidence that supports them; and Moldwin fails to mention anything about falsification.
Moldwin’s distinction between ‘textbook’ and ‘frontier’ science is, as he admits, ‘not necessarily immutable.’ Indeed, it would seem that all scientific theories must of necessity begin life as frontier science, though only some of them survive to become textbook science. Moldwin doesn’t say how long a theory has to survive in order to become ‘textbook science’; presumably, surviving long enough to make it into a textbook will suffice. Of course, there are many examples of textbook science being falsified and replaced with what was frontier science. Being textbook science does not guarantee being true, and being frontier science does not imply being false. Besides, both ‘frontier’ and ‘textbook’ science are scientific; the difference between them is purely one of degree (e.g. the issue is how long the theory been subjected to ‘reality therapy’ and how far into the scientific community the theory has penetrated).
Although I have some quibbles with Moldwin’s criteria of scientific demarcation, I am seeking to answer the question: ‘Given Moldwin’s criteria for distinguishing between science and pseudoscience, is ID science or pseudoscience?’ It is my contention that, whether or not Moldwin’s demarcation criteria ‘work’, Intelligent Design is a science. However, it is also my contention that ID qualifies as a science given Moldwin’s criteria of demarcation. This point is not insignificant because it shows that ID counts as science according to criteria that a contributor to an anti-ID publication such as Skeptical Inquirer can accept.
I will apply Moldwin’s criteria to ID in their ‘sociological’ and ‘reality therapy’ categories, subdividing these categories into as many criteria as I can find in Moldwin’s article:
It should be admitted that ID is currently a minority position amongst scientists and that many scientists have derided it as pseudoscience. On this account, one could argue that ID currently fails to qualify as ‘textbook’ science. However, it would seem that ID passes all of the individual sociological criteria that Moldwin sets out in his article. On this account, one can argue that ID is currently ‘frontier science’ (after-all, ID is not only a new scientific theory but a new scientific paradigm, and it is only some 15 years old):
ID is not supported by all or even most people having appropriate educational qualifications. However, ID is supported by people ‘having the appropriate educational credentials’. (That many people who don’t have appropriate educational credentials support ID is beside the point, as the same could be said of SETI or Darwinism). One need only consider design theorists such as Michael J. Behe, Paul Chien, William Lane Craig, William A. Dembski, Ronald F. Hirsch, Cornelius G. Hunter, Dean Kenyon, Robert C. Koons, Scott Minnich, Stephen C. Meyer, J.P. Moreland, Alvin Plantinga, Marcus Ross, Stanley Salthe, Giuseppe Sermonti and Jonathan Wells to see that this is the case.
In response to a recent American television series on evolution, 132 qualified scientists signed a joint statement (which over 300 scientists have now signed) saying: ‘We are sceptical of claims for the ability of random mutation and natural selection to account for the complexity of life.’:
Signers of the statement questioning Darwinism came from throughout the US and from several other countries, representing biology, physics, chemistry, mathematics, geology, anthropology and other scientific fields. Professors and researchers at such universities as Princeton, MIT, U Penn, and Yale, as well as smaller colleges and the National Laboratories at Livermore, CA and Los Alamos, N.M., are included.
Design theorists have undergone peer review of their ideas and have published in peer-reviewed books and scientific journals.
Peer-reviewed books supporting design include: Charles B. Thaxton, Walter L. Bradley and Roger L. Olsen’s The Mystery of Life’s Origin: Reassessing Current Theories (Philosophical Library, 1984, Lewis & Stanley, 4th ed., 1992); William A. Dembski’s The Design Inference (Cambridge University Press) and Michael J. Behe’s Darwin’s Black Box (The Free Press).
Scientific and philosophical articles supporting Intelligent Design have been published in peer-reviewed scientific anthologies such as: five science articles from Darwinism, Design, & Public Education, edited by John Angus Campbell and Stephen C. Meyer (Michigan State University Press, 2003); four science articles from W. A. Dembski & M. Ruse, (ed.’s), Debating Design: From Darwin To DNA (Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2004); and the fifteen scientific and philosophical articles in William A. Dembski (ed.) Mere Creation (IVP, 1998).
Moreover, ID research ‘is being published and cited in the peer-reviewed scientific literature (including the biological literature)’, appearing in journals including: Journal of Molecular Biology; Protein Science; Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington; Rivista di Biologia/Biology Forum; Progress in Complexity, Information, And Design; Origins & Design Journal; Nature; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences; International Journal of Fuzzy Systems; Journal of Theoretical Biology; Origins of Life and Evolution of the Biosphere; Atmospheric Environment and Annual Review of Genetics.
Pro-ID articles have also appeared in peer-reviewed philosophy journals such as: Philosophy of Science; British Journal for the Philosophy of Science and Philosophia Christi.
As Francis J. Beckwith reports: ‘ID proponents. . . have had their work published by prestigious presses and in academic journals, have aired their views among critics in the corridors of major universities and institutions, and have been recognized by leading periodicals, both academic and non-academic.’ By discussing their ideas at various conferences, as well as in written and spoken debate with sceptics, design theorists have not avoided critical assessment of their ideas (cf. Richard F. Carlson, Science & Christianity: Four Views, IVP, 2000; John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer, ed.’s, Darwinism, Design, And Public Education, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003; William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse, ed.’s, Debating Design, Cambridge University Press, 2004). Indeed, they have promoted such assessment, which has included testing their scientific ideas by comparison to previous understanding and observations. Just as Darwin promoted his theory of evolution in dialogue with the theory of design or creationism in the Origin, so design theorists promote the theory of design in dialogue with the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution.
ID theorists challenge the rule of ‘methodological naturalism’ (at least as understood by many scientists) as necessary for science. However, Moldwin does not mention methodological naturalism as being a part of the essence of science, only: ‘the constant testing of any scientific idea against reality.’
ID theorists do follow ‘the scientific method’ in that they concern themselves with making inferences to the best explanation on the basis of data derived from observation of nature (e.g. gene knock-out experiments, the results of abiogenesis experiments, observations about the nature of stars, the solar system, biological macro-molecules, cellular machinery, etc.).
ID motivated research being published in peer-reviewed books and journals constitute useful scientific results – results that are independent of the design inference design theorists make on the basis of such research. The ID paradigm is also beginning to show promise as a guide to scientific research.
ID has forged links with many established scientific fields of study, including information theory, cosmology, astrobiology, molecular biology, and SETI itself. The stated mission of the SETI institute, ‘to explore, understand, and explain the origin, nature, and prevalence of life in the universe’, could easily be taken as the stated mission statement of ID! SETI relies upon distinguishing between electro-magnetic signals that are naturally occurring and signals that are the result of intelligent design. Hence the detection of intelligent design is already part-and-parcel of science, and the work of ID theorists such as Dembski on design detection criteria can be taken as a contribution to the work of SETI. Indeed, Dembski uses the detection of a message from space as an example of detecting design via the presence of specified complexity.
ID theorists appeal to empirical evidence. Like the observational verification advanced for UFOlogy, there is debate about the best interpretation (and even, on occasion, the existence) of this evidence. However, such debate often seems fuelled by differing philosophical assumptions, such as the legitimacy of setting aside ‘methodological naturalism’ in science. Nevertheless, design theorists often appeal to observational evidence that is accepted by scientists outside the ID movement. Compare, for example, the books Rare Earth by Peter Ward & Donald Brownlee (Springer-Verlag, 2003) and The Privileged Planet by ID theorists Guillermo Gonzalez & Jay Wesley Richards (Regnery Publishing, 2004). Consider, too, the evidence of cosmic fine-tuning that engendered debate about the various so-called ‘anthropic-principles’.
ID concepts have not made their way into scientific textbooks as yet, excepting supplementary and home-schooling textbooks. However, negative critiques of Darwinian ‘icons’ by ID theorists have affected science textbook content. Mathematician Granville Sewell’s textbook, The Numerical Solution of Ordinary and Partial Differential Equations, 2nd Edition, (Wiley, 2005), contains an appendix (Appendix D) that William A. Dembski describes as ‘pure ID’. ID has also found its way into Philosophy textbooks, where it is discussed in relation to philosophy of religion. For example, cf. Ronald H. Nash’s Life’s Ultimate Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy, (Zondervan, 1999). Moreover, ID concepts have made their way into peer-reviewed journal articles and into scientific books (as well as books on the history and philosophy of science).
Mike Gene reports that: ‘Behe’s concept of irreducible complexity (IC) has found itself in the peer-reviewed scientific literature. . . and is being taken seriously by scientists.’ As a case in point, Dr. Massimo Pigliucci (an Associate Professor at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, where he teaches ecology and evolutionary biology), writes that: ‘Behe. . . does have a point concerning irreducible complexity. . . irreducible complexity is indeed a hallmark of intelligent design.’ If there is evidence of irreducible complexity in living organisms, then Pigliucci agrees that it is evidence of intelligent design: ‘irreducible complexity is indeed a valid criterion to distinguish between intelligent and nonintelligent design.’ However, Pigliucci thinks that: ‘there is no evidence so far of irreducible complexity in living organisms.’ At least he is open to the evidence.
It would seem that if one accepts Mark Moldwin’s demarcation criteria for distinguishing science from pseudoscience then ID has a strong claim to be recognized as science. ID does not fall unequivocally on the ‘science’ side of all of the individual criteria proposed by Moldwin, but he does not appear to advance these criteria as jointly necessary and sufficient conditions of being scientific. Instead, Moldwin offers his criteria as being: ‘often good indicators of whether an area of study belongs in the realm of science or pseudoscience’. If Moldwin’s criteria are treated simply as ‘good indicators of whether an area of study belongs in the realm of science or pseudoscience’, then they seem to indicate that ID belongs in the realm of science.
ID is accepted as science by (an admitted minority of) people having appropriate educational credentials; ID theorists have published relevant articles in a number of respected peer-reviewed journals; they have allowed (even encouraged) their work to be scrutinized and criticized by their scientific colleagues, discussing their ideas at scientific meetings and conferences as well as in print and on the internet; they have not avoided critical assessment of their ideas or the constant testing of their scientific ideas compared to previous understanding and observations; they have followed ‘scientific method’ (while questioning the necessity of ‘methodological naturalism’ to that method) - ID is committed to ‘reality therapy’; they have produced useful scientific results; and they have forged links with established scientific fields of study (including SETI). Finally, ID theorists claim observational verification for their theory (and although this interpretation of the evidence is disputed, such disputation is often clearly the result of an acceptance of the ‘methodological naturalism’ rejected by ID theorists), and they have had advances in their field (advances in terms of both the conceptual apparatus of ID and relevant scientific research) recognized (and quoted favourably) in peer-reviewed articles and by scientists outside of the ID movement.
Therefore, it seems to me that anyone who accepts Moldwin’s demarcation criteria should accept that ID is a science (albeit ‘frontier science’) and not pseudoscience. Of course, this does not mean that they have to embrace ID as being good science, or as being true. But it does mean acknowledging that the debate about ID is a scientific debate, and that ID should be given a fair crack at becoming ‘textbook science’.
 Francis J. Beckwith, Law, Darwinism, and Public Education: The Establishment Clause and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. xiii.
 cf. William Lane Craig, ‘Review: The Design Inference – Eliminating chance through small possibilities’ @ www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/design.html; Dembski, William A., ‘The Third Mode of Explanation’ @ www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDB-download.php?id=61; William A. Dembski, ‘Intelligent Design as a Theory of Information’ @ www.arn.org/docs/dembski/wd_idtheory.htm; ‘The Logical Underpinnings of Design’ @ www.designinference.com/documents/2002.10.logicalunderpinningsofID.pdf; No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot be Purchased without Intelligence, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001)
 William Lane Craig, ‘Review: The Design Inference – Eliminating chance through small possibilities’ @ www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/design.html
 cf. Hugh Ross, ‘Probability for a Life Support Body’ @ www.reasons.org/resources/apologetics/design_evidences/20020502_life_support_body_prob.shtml?main; Guillermo Gonzalez and Jay Richards, The Privileged Planet: How Our Place in the Cosmos Is Designed for Discovery, (Regnery, Jan. 2004); Jimmy H. Davies & Harry L. Poe, Designer Universe: Intelligent Design and the Existence of God, (Broadman & Holman, 2002)
 cf. Michael J. Behe, ‘Molecular Machines: Experimental Support for the Design Inference’ @ www.arn.org/docs/behe/mb_mm92496.htm; ‘Darwin Under the Microscope’ @ http://catholiceducation.org/articles/science/sc0017.html; Darwin’s Black Box (Free Press, 1998); William A. Dembski, No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot be Purchased without Intelligence (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); ‘Irreducible Complexity Revisited’ @ www.designinference.com/documents/2004.01.Irred_Compl_Revisited.pdf; ‘Still Spinning Just Fine: A Response to Ken Miller’ @ www.designinference.com/documents/2003.02.Miller_Response.htm; See E. Coli swimming using flagella @ www.mtmi.vu.lt/pfk/funkc_dariniai/nanostructures/bacteria.htm
 cf. Stephen C. Meyer, ‘The Origin of Biological Information and the Higher Taxonomic Categories’, @ www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=2177&program=CSC%20-%20Scientific%20Research%20and%20Scholarship%20-%20Science; Kurt P. Wise, ‘The Origin of Life’s Major Groups’, in J.P. Moreland (ed.), The Creation Hypothesis, (IVP, 1994); Robert F. Dehaan and John L. Wiester, ‘The Cambrian Explosion: The Fossil Record and Intelligent Design’, in William A. Dembski & James M. Kushiner (ed.’s), Signs of Intelligence, (Brazos Press, 2001); & Stephen C. Meyer, Marcus Ross, Paul Nelson and Paul Chien, ‘The Cambrian Explosion: Biology’s Big Bang’, in John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer (ed.’s), Darwinism, Design, And Public Education, (Michigan State University Press, 2003) @ www.discovery.org/articleFiles/PDFs/Cambrian.pdf
 If ID is not a science, then it still might contain an element of truth as a philosophy.
 cf. Peter Ward & Donald Brownlee, Rare Earth, (Springer-Verlag, 2003), www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0387952896/qid=1098956538/sr=2-1/ref=pd_ka_b_2_1/103-4646922-9638218
 cf. ‘Annotated Bibliography of Peer reviewed Publications Supporting The Theory Of Intelligent Design ’ @ www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=2640&program=CSC%20-%20Scientific%20Research%20and%20Scholarship%20-%20Science
 William A. Dembski, The Design Revolution, (IVP, 2004), p. 305. Dembski’s book The Design Inference has been cited favourably in mainstream scientific literature, including in peer reviewed articles: W.-E. Loennig & H. Saedler, ‘Chromosome Rearrangements and Transposable Elements,’ Annual Review of Genetics, 36 (2002): 389–410. This article examines the role of transposons in the abrupt origin of new species and the possibility of a partly predetermined generation of biodiversity and new species. The authors’ approach in non-Darwinian, and they cite favourably the work of Michael Behe and William Dembski; D.K.Y. Chiu & T.H. Lui, ‘Integrated Use of Multiple Interdependent Patterns for Biomolecular Sequence Analysis,’ International Journal of Fuzzy Systems, 4(3) (September 2002): 766–775; Life Evolving: Molecules, Mind, and Meaning, by Christian de Duve (Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 52-53) (de Duve doesn’t conclude design, but he cites Dembski favourably). cf. www.ideacenter.org/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/1163
 cf. Axe, D.D., ‘Extreme Functional Sensitivity to Conservative Amino Acid Changes on Enzyme Exteriors’ @ http://nsmserver2.fullerton.edu/departments/chemistry/evolution_creation/web/AxeProteinEvolution.pdf
 Michael J. Behe & David W. Snoke, ‘Simulating Evolution by Gene Duplication of Protein Features that Require Multiple Amino Acid Residues’ @ www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=2183&program=CSC%20-%20Scientific%20Research%20and%20Scholarship%20-%20Science
 Meyer, Stephen C., ‘The Origin of Biological Information and the Higher Taxonomic Categories’ @ www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=2177&program=CSC%20-%20Scientific%20Research%20and%20Scholarship%20-%20Science (cf. Mark Hartwig, ‘Bitten’ @ www.arn.org/blogs/index.php/2/2004/09/23/bitten; ‘One Long Bluff’ @ www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=2228 & ‘Neo-Darwinism’s Unsolved Problem of Morphological Novelty’ @ www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=2248&program=CSC%20-%20Scientific%20Research%20and%20Scholarship%20-%20Science%20-%20MainPage)
 e.g. The 1992 symposium 'Darwinism: Scientific Inference or Philosophical Preference?' organized by the Foundation for Thought and Ethics (cf. www.fteonline.com/symposium.htm); The 1996 ‘Mere Creation’ Conference (cf. www.leaderu.com/orgs/arn/odesign/od181/mere181.htm); The 2000 ‘Nature of Nature’ Conference (cf. www.designinference.com/documents/2000.04.nature_of_nature.htm);
The 2002 ‘Intelligent Design and Evolution Awareness Conference at USF’ (cf. www.ideacenter.org/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/804)
The 2004 ‘Intelligent Design and the Future of Science National Conference’ at Biola University (cf. www.arn.org/arnproducts/videos/v053.htm)
 cf. Mark Hartwig, ‘How Many Scientists Take This Stuff Seriously?’ @ www.arn.org/idfaq/How%20many%20scientists%20take%20this%20stuff%20seriously.htm; www.intelligentdesignnetwork.org/2004symposium.htm; Richard F. Carlson, Science & Christianity: Four Views, (IVP, 2000) @ www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0830822623/qid=1098959835/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/103-4646922-9638218?v=glance&s=books; John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer, (ed.’s), Darwinism, Design, And Public Education, East (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003) @ www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0870136704/qid=1098960024/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/103-4646922-9638218?v=glance&s=books; William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse (ed.’s), Debating Design, (Cambridge University Press, 2004) @ www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0521829496/qid=1098959911/sr=2-1/ref=pd_ka_b_2_1/103-4646922-9638218
 Francis J. Beckwith, Law, Darwinism, and Public Education: The Establishment Clause and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. xvi-xvii.
 cf. ‘Does intelligent design theory implement the scientific method?’ @ www.ideacenter.org/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/1154
 cf. ‘What sort of progress has intelligent design theory made recently?’ @ www.ideacenter.org/contentmgr/showdetails.php/id/1180
 cf. Jonathan Wells, ‘Using Intelligent Design as a Theory to Guide Scientific Research’ @ www.iscid.org/papers/Wells_TOPS_051304.pdf; ‘Another Biology Journal Publishes Article Applying Intelligent Design Theory To Scientific Research’ @ www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/index.php?command=view&id=2627&program=CSC%20-%20Scientific%20Research%20and%20Scholarship%20-%20Science
 As can The Privileged Planet by Guillermo Gonzalez & Jay Wesley Richards (Regnery Publishing, 2004).
 For example, cf. Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, (Free Press, 1996); John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer, (ed.’s), Darwinism, Design, And Public Education, East (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003); Guillermo Gonzalez & Jay Wesley Richards, The Privileged Planet, (Regnery Publishing, 2004).
 cf. Percival Davis and Dean H. Kenyon, Of Pandas and People @ www.arn.org/arnproducts/php/book_show_item.php?id=18
 cf. ‘In Textbook Battle over Evolution, "Errors" Debated, Corrected’ @ www.arn.org/docs2/news/evolutionerrors111003.htm; Jonathan Wells ‘An Evaluation of Ten Recent Biology Textbooks And Their Use of Selected Icons of Evolution Evaluated’ @ www.arn.org/docs/wells/jw_tbookreport900.htm
 cf. Charles B. Thaxton & Nancey Pearcey, The Soul Of Science: Christian Faith and Natural Philosophy, (Crossway Books, 1994)
 Massimo Pigliucci, ‘Design Yes, Intelligent No’, in John Angus Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer, (ed.’s), Darwin, Design, And Public Education, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2003), p. 467.
 ibid, p. 471.
 ibid, p. 467.
 cf. Michael J. Behe, Darwin’s Black Box, (Free Press, 1996); William A. Dembski, No Free Lunch, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
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