Science Literature

Secularists repeatedly tell us that all beliefs are constructed by the human brain as a response to social and historical environments. They are responding to observations of humanity's apparently endless stream of beliefs in supernatural causation. Some of these examples are recognised as religious beliefs; others (such as astrology and ESP) are labelled superstitions and still others (such as belief in UFOs and the importance of coincidences) are often linked to New Ageism. Michael Shermer has a scholarly interest in explaining all of them as manifestations of human cognitive behaviour. He suggests these beliefs can be explained in two basic ways:

"One is the brain's readiness to perceive patterns over random behaviour. The other is its readiness to nominate agency - intentional action - as the cause of natural events. [. . .] The important point, Shermer says, is that we form our beliefs first and then look for evidence in support of them afterwards. He gives the names 'patternicity' and 'agenticity' to the brain's pattern-seeking and agency-attributing propensities, respectively. These underlie the diverse reasons why we form particular beliefs from subjective, personal and emotional promptings, in social and historical environments that influence their content."

Can science preserve us from being superstitious? (source here)

The general explanatory framework involves the brain creating meaning from stochastic data by a process of self-deluded induction. Whether the brain infers that patterns in "noise" are purposeful, or whether chance events are interpreted as intentional, the outcomes are the same: irrational beliefs about the world involving non-natural agents.

"As a 'belief engine', the brain is always seeking to find meaning in the information that pours into it. Once it has constructed a belief, it rationalizes it with explanations, almost always after the event. The brain thus becomes invested in the beliefs, and reinforces them by looking for supporting evidence while blinding itself to anything contrary. Shermer describes this process as "belief-dependent realism" - what we believe determines our reality, not the other way round."

As is usual in such studies, evolutionary theories provide context and plausible scenarios to reinforce the argument:

"He offers an evolution-based analysis of why people are forming supernatural beliefs based on patternicity and agenticity. Our ancestors did well to wonder whether rustling in the grass indicated a predator, even if it was just the breeze. Spotting a significant pattern in the data may have meant an intentional agent was about to pounce."

This is a depressing picture: humanity is embroiled in irrational beliefs from which we need rescuing. How can we be delivered from the fantasies secreted by our own brains? The saviour, according to Shermer, is amongst us - help is at hand!

"How did we ever arrive at a more objective and organised knowledge of the world? How do we tell the difference between noise and data? His answer is science. "Despite the subjectivity of our psychologies, relatively objective knowledge is available," Shermer writes. [. . .] Knowledge is power: the corrective of the scientific method, one hopes, can rescue us from ourselves in this respect."

A distinguishing feature of science is the testing of hypotheses by reference to empirical data. Shermer (and Grayling) claim some evidence to justify the hypothesis of belief-dependent realism.
1. The phenomenon of religious scientists (e.g. Francis Collins). This is said to be "interesting" because they exhibit "the impermeability of the internal barrier that allows simultaneous commitments to science and faith". The barrier is (writes Grayling) demonstrable because "scarcely any of them would accept the challenge to mount a controlled experiment to test the major claims of their faith, such as asking the deity to regrow a severed limb for an accident victim."
2. The existence of atheism. Atheism is considered "partial evidence" against the idea that theistic belief is a hard-wired phenomenon.
3. God-believing religions are said to be "very young in historical terms". Grayling interprets this in terms of the evolution of beliefs: theistic religions seem to have developed after mankind adopted agricultural and non-nomadic lifestyles, "and are therefore less than 10,000 years old".

In the interests of conciseness, and for the benefit of those who find these justifications underwhelming, I do not intend to detail these supposed tests of the hypothesis. All I am going to say here is that these tests serve to convince only those who already believe in the creeds of atheism.

The above comment is intended to stimulate the questions: "What are beliefs?" and "Is a commitment to science to be contrasted with a commitment to faith?" It is here that Shermer (and Grayling) evidence a superficiality of analysis that is inexcusable. Whilst some beliefs are a substitute for knowledge (and in many cases are in conflict with knowledge), it is patently obvious that some beliefs harmonise with knowledge. The contemporary fad of asking "Do you believe in evolution?" (even to Miss USA contestants!) illustrates the point. If the answer is "yes", some questioners may conclude that the respondent is a rational, truth-seeking promoter of science! Also, the questioner may infer that the non-believer is an obscurantist hiding from reality. I use this example just to point out that even in common language, "belief" does not imply irrational patternicity or agenticity. Shermer (and Grayling) owe it to their readers to ask whether some beliefs fall into the knowledge-based category. It appears that Shermer wants to redefine the word "belief" so that it is never applied to science, but this leads to a circular reasoning process where he concludes what he has already defined.

Shermer is described as being "once an evangelical Christian", but who "lost his faith largely as a result of his college studies of psychology and cognitive neuroscience". If he really understood evangelical Christianity, Shermer should know that the Christian meaning of "faith" is not believing something without evidence, but is trust in a person on the basis of evidence. For Christians, faith incorporates cognitive elements but is fundamentally a relationship. Christianity is based on evidence, because Christians recognise the acts of God in history. To suggest that these objective characteristics can be explained by patternicity and agenticity is to offer a weak argument that fails to engage with the challenging responses that Christianity provides.

Shermer should be aware of Christian contributions to epistemology (the study of the nature of knowledge). Christians have answers to questions like "How do we develop beliefs?" and "How do we know that a belief is true?" Unfortunately, these discussions do not inform Shermer's approach. In any other sphere of scholarship, neglect of the contributions of other scholars would be deemed unprofessional, or even shoddy. The net result is that Shermer ends up reinforcing the prejudices of fellow-atheists, but this should not be confused with contributing to knowledge.

Grayling thinks Shermer's analysis is correct: "This stimulating book summarizes what is likely to prove the right view of how our brains secrete religious and superstitious belief." Both Shermer and Grayling consider that science can help us escape irrational beliefs. But is science able to do this? Can it dispel ignorance and superstition? What we would expect here is an appeal to evidence. We should be presented with data that demonstrates a causal link between the adoption of science as a worldview and the erosion of irrational beliefs in society. What we get are assertions. Shermer and Grayling think science ought to have this effect, but we are not supplied with any evidence that it actually achieves the outcome.

Here are some data of relevance to these questions. We have a trend of increasing secularism in the UK and in the US. are there discernible trends elating to superstitions? In the UK, during the National Science Week in 2003, a survey was undertaken of superstitious behaviour. The first two findings are as follows:

"* The current levels of superstitious behaviour and beliefs in the UK are surprisingly high, even among those with a scientific background. Touching wood is the most popular UK superstition, followed by crossing fingers, avoiding ladders, not smashing mirrors, carrying a lucky charm and having superstitious beliefs about the number 13."
"* Superstitious people tend to worry about life, have a strong need for control, and have a low tolerance for ambiguity."
Also, from later in the report, "People become less superstitious as they age - 59% of people aged 11-15 said they were superstitious, compared to 44% of people aged between 31-40 and just 35% of the over 50s.
These findings do not suggest that superstitious behaviour and beliefs will be consigned to the past. Instead, they are strongly held by the younger members of society."

In 2009, via a ComRes poll, the situation was worse. Here is a comment from Tony Watkins:

"That's roughly a four-fold increase in belief in ghosts and astrology, and a doubling of belief in tarot. Interesting, given that Richard Dawkins and other atheists think they are driving superstition away along with religious belief (they see the two as the same category, of course, which they are not)."

In the US, during 2007-08, a detailed survey was undertaken in the Unites States on the state of religion in the country by Baylor University. The outcomes do not fit Shermer's analysis at all: traditional Christianity greatly decreases credulity, as measured by beliefs in such things as dreams, Bigfoot, UFOs, haunted houses, communicating with the dead and astrology. The Press Release has this comment:

"It remains widely believed that religious people are especially credulous, particularly those who identify themselves as Evangelicals, born again, Bible believers and fundamentalists. However, the ISR researchers found that conservative religious Americans are far less likely to believe in the occult and paranormal than are other Americans, with self-identified theological liberals and the irreligious far more likely than other Americans to believe. The researchers say this shows that it is not religion in general that suppresses such beliefs, but conservative religion."

We have seen recently that cultural bias is a real issue for contemporary scholars. We are witnessing atheist scholars promoting ideas that reinforce their personal worldview, but we need to be asking how far their research is affected by bias. They (like all researchers) need to be challenging their own favoured perspectives, and engaging with the best arguments coming from those who differ from them. All the signs are that they are not doing this. Shermer lumps all beliefs together and shows no interest in interacting with those whose beliefs are based on evidence. Grayling reviews Shermer to congratulate him on his insights. The message is passed down to popularisers who regurgitate this false analysis.

A Christian perspective on these matters was provided by Melvin Tinker earlier this year. The article is worthy of reading in full. However, the concluding paragraph is as follows:

"C.S. Lewis observed a number of years ago that, when Christianity is strong, superstition is weak, and vice versa. The 21st century was meant to be the scientific century and the triumph of reason. But what we find is an abundance of superstition which projects us back in time, resulting in a lack of security and hope. And yet these are the very things which come with the Christian gospel."

How we form beliefs
A. C. Grayling
Nature, 474, 446-447 (23 June 2011) | doi:10.1038/474446a

Review of The Believing Brain: From Ghosts and Gods to Politics and Conspiracies - How We Construct Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths by Michael Shermer.