Science Literature

Secularists repeatedly tell us that all beliefs are constructed by the human brain as a response to social and historical environments. They are responding to observations of humanity's apparently endless stream of beliefs in supernatural causation. Some of these examples are recognised as religious beliefs; others (such as astrology and ESP) are labelled superstitions and still others (such as belief in UFOs and the importance of coincidences) are often linked to New Ageism. Michael Shermer has a scholarly interest in explaining all of them as manifestations of human cognitive behaviour. He suggests these beliefs can be explained in two basic ways:

"One is the brain's readiness to perceive patterns over random behaviour. The other is its readiness to nominate agency - intentional action - as the cause of natural events. [. . .] The important point, Shermer says, is that we form our beliefs first and then look for evidence in support of them afterwards. He gives the names 'patternicity' and 'agenticity' to the brain's pattern-seeking and agency-attributing propensities, respectively. These underlie the diverse reasons why we form particular beliefs from subjective, personal and emotional promptings, in social and historical environments that influence their content."

Can science preserve us from being superstitious? (source here)

The general explanatory framework involves the brain creating meaning from stochastic data by a process of self-deluded induction. Whether the brain infers that patterns in "noise" are purposeful, or whether chance events are interpreted as intentional, the outcomes are the same: irrational beliefs about the world involving non-natural agents.

"As a 'belief engine', the brain is always seeking to find meaning in the information that pours into it. Once it has constructed a belief, it rationalizes it with explanations, almost always after the event. The brain thus becomes invested in the beliefs, and reinforces them by looking for supporting evidence while blinding itself to anything contrary. Shermer describes this process as "belief-dependent realism" - what we believe determines our reality, not the other way round."

As is usual in such studies, evolutionary theories provide context and plausible scenarios to reinforce the argument:

"He offers an evolution-based analysis of why people are forming supernatural beliefs based on patternicity and agenticity. Our ancestors did well to wonder whether rustling in the grass indicated a predator, even if it was just the breeze. Spotting a significant pattern in the data may have meant an intentional agent was about to pounce."

This is a depressing picture: humanity is embroiled in irrational beliefs from which we need rescuing. How can we be delivered from the fantasies secreted by our own brains? The saviour, according to Shermer, is amongst us - help is at hand!

"How did we ever arrive at a more objective and organised knowledge of the world? How do we tell the difference between noise and data? His answer is science. "Despite the subjectivity of our psychologies, relatively objective knowledge is available," Shermer writes. [. . .] Knowledge is power: the corrective of the scientific method, one hopes, can rescue us from ourselves in this respect."

A distinguishing feature of science is the testing of hypotheses by reference to empirical data. Shermer (and Grayling) claim some evidence to justify the hypothesis of belief-dependent realism.
1. The phenomenon of religious scientists (e.g. Francis Collins). This is said to be "interesting" because they exhibit "the impermeability of the internal barrier that allows simultaneous commitments to science and faith". The barrier is (writes Grayling) demonstrable because "scarcely any of them would accept the challenge to mount a controlled experiment to test the major claims of their faith, such as asking the deity to regrow a severed limb for an accident victim."
2. The existence of atheism. Atheism is considered "partial evidence" against the idea that theistic belief is a hard-wired phenomenon.
3. God-believing religions are said to be "very young in historical terms". Grayling interprets this in terms of the evolution of beliefs: theistic religions seem to have developed after mankind adopted agricultural and non-nomadic lifestyles, "and are therefore less than 10,000 years old".

In the interests of conciseness, and for the benefit of those who find these justifications underwhelming, I do not intend to detail these supposed tests of the hypothesis. All I am going to say here is that these tests serve to convince only those who already believe in the creeds of atheism.

The above comment is intended to stimulate the questions: "What are beliefs?" and "Is a commitment to science to be contrasted with a commitment to faith?" It is here that Shermer (and Grayling) evidence a superficiality of analysis that is inexcusable. Whilst some beliefs are a substitute for knowledge (and in many cases are in conflict with knowledge), it is patently obvious that some beliefs harmonise with knowledge. The contemporary fad of asking "Do you believe in evolution?" (even to Miss USA contestants!) illustrates the point. If the answer is "yes", some questioners may conclude that the respondent is a rational, truth-seeking promoter of science! Also, the questioner may infer that the non-believer is an obscurantist hiding from reality. I use this example just to point out that even in common language, "belief" does not imply irrational patternicity or agenticity. Shermer (and Grayling) owe it to their readers to ask whether some beliefs fall into the knowledge-based category. It appears that Shermer wants to redefine the word "belief" so that it is never applied to science, but this leads to a circular reasoning process where he concludes what he has already defined.

Shermer is described as being "once an evangelical Christian", but who "lost his faith largely as a result of his college studies of psychology and cognitive neuroscience". If he really understood evangelical Christianity, Shermer should know that the Christian meaning of "faith" is not believing something without evidence, but is trust in a person on the basis of evidence. For Christians, faith incorporates cognitive elements but is fundamentally a relationship. Christianity is based on evidence, because Christians recognise the acts of God in history. To suggest that these objective characteristics can be explained by patternicity and agenticity is to offer a weak argument that fails to engage with the challenging responses that Christianity provides.

Shermer should be aware of Christian contributions to epistemology (the study of the nature of knowledge). Christians have answers to questions like "How do we develop beliefs?" and "How do we know that a belief is true?" Unfortunately, these discussions do not inform Shermer's approach. In any other sphere of scholarship, neglect of the contributions of other scholars would be deemed unprofessional, or even shoddy. The net result is that Shermer ends up reinforcing the prejudices of fellow-atheists, but this should not be confused with contributing to knowledge.

Grayling thinks Shermer's analysis is correct: "This stimulating book summarizes what is likely to prove the right view of how our brains secrete religious and superstitious belief." Both Shermer and Grayling consider that science can help us escape irrational beliefs. But is science able to do this? Can it dispel ignorance and superstition? What we would expect here is an appeal to evidence. We should be presented with data that demonstrates a causal link between the adoption of science as a worldview and the erosion of irrational beliefs in society. What we get are assertions. Shermer and Grayling think science ought to have this effect, but we are not supplied with any evidence that it actually achieves the outcome.

Here are some data of relevance to these questions. We have a trend of increasing secularism in the UK and in the US. are there discernible trends elating to superstitions? In the UK, during the National Science Week in 2003, a survey was undertaken of superstitious behaviour. The first two findings are as follows:

"* The current levels of superstitious behaviour and beliefs in the UK are surprisingly high, even among those with a scientific background. Touching wood is the most popular UK superstition, followed by crossing fingers, avoiding ladders, not smashing mirrors, carrying a lucky charm and having superstitious beliefs about the number 13."
"* Superstitious people tend to worry about life, have a strong need for control, and have a low tolerance for ambiguity."
Also, from later in the report, "People become less superstitious as they age - 59% of people aged 11-15 said they were superstitious, compared to 44% of people aged between 31-40 and just 35% of the over 50s.
These findings do not suggest that superstitious behaviour and beliefs will be consigned to the past. Instead, they are strongly held by the younger members of society."

In 2009, via a ComRes poll, the situation was worse. Here is a comment from Tony Watkins:

"That's roughly a four-fold increase in belief in ghosts and astrology, and a doubling of belief in tarot. Interesting, given that Richard Dawkins and other atheists think they are driving superstition away along with religious belief (they see the two as the same category, of course, which they are not)."

In the US, during 2007-08, a detailed survey was undertaken in the Unites States on the state of religion in the country by Baylor University. The outcomes do not fit Shermer's analysis at all: traditional Christianity greatly decreases credulity, as measured by beliefs in such things as dreams, Bigfoot, UFOs, haunted houses, communicating with the dead and astrology. The Press Release has this comment:

"It remains widely believed that religious people are especially credulous, particularly those who identify themselves as Evangelicals, born again, Bible believers and fundamentalists. However, the ISR researchers found that conservative religious Americans are far less likely to believe in the occult and paranormal than are other Americans, with self-identified theological liberals and the irreligious far more likely than other Americans to believe. The researchers say this shows that it is not religion in general that suppresses such beliefs, but conservative religion."

We have seen recently that cultural bias is a real issue for contemporary scholars. We are witnessing atheist scholars promoting ideas that reinforce their personal worldview, but we need to be asking how far their research is affected by bias. They (like all researchers) need to be challenging their own favoured perspectives, and engaging with the best arguments coming from those who differ from them. All the signs are that they are not doing this. Shermer lumps all beliefs together and shows no interest in interacting with those whose beliefs are based on evidence. Grayling reviews Shermer to congratulate him on his insights. The message is passed down to popularisers who regurgitate this false analysis.

A Christian perspective on these matters was provided by Melvin Tinker earlier this year. The article is worthy of reading in full. However, the concluding paragraph is as follows:

"C.S. Lewis observed a number of years ago that, when Christianity is strong, superstition is weak, and vice versa. The 21st century was meant to be the scientific century and the triumph of reason. But what we find is an abundance of superstition which projects us back in time, resulting in a lack of security and hope. And yet these are the very things which come with the Christian gospel."

How we form beliefs
A. C. Grayling
Nature, 474, 446-447 (23 June 2011) | doi:10.1038/474446a

Review of The Believing Brain: From Ghosts and Gods to Politics and Conspiracies - How We Construct Beliefs and Reinforce Them as Truths by Michael Shermer.

One of the few books of Stephen Jay Gould I never read was his Mismeasure of Man. I suppose it was a low priority - as I have never considered cranial capacity a measure of intelligence or state of advancement. This is partly because of an awareness that women tend to have smaller skulls than men and yet this has no bearing on their cognitive skills. I knew that Gould was taking Samuel George Morton to task because Morton had considered cranial capacity to be significant for ranking human races in some sort of hierarchical order. Gould considered that Morton provided a case study of someone who had "finangled" his data and his analysis to reach unwarranted conclusions. His 1978 paper concluded in this way:

"Yet, through all this juggling, I find no indication of fraud or conscious manipulation. Morton made no attempt to cover his tracks, and I must assume that he remained unaware of their existence. He explained everything he did, and published all his raw data. All I discern is an a priori conviction of racial ranking so powerful that it directed his tabulations along pre-established lines. Yet Morton was widely hailed as the objectivist of his age, the man who would rescue American science from the mire of unsupported speculation."

Biological determinism is a minefield for the unwary - and for the mature (source here)

Gould carried the day with his analysis of Morton's work. There were some who questioned his conclusions, but most regarded Gould's paper and book as definitive. It took on an iconic status.

"Gould used Morton as a case study to argue that "unconscious or dimly perceived finagling, doctoring, and massaging are rampant, endemic, and unavoidable in a profession that awards status and power for clean and unambiguous discovery". Gould's analysis of Morton is widely read, frequently cited, and still commonly assigned in university courses. Morton has become a canonical example of scientific misconduct and an oft-told cautionary tale of how human variation is inevitably mismeasured."

The icon has been demolished by Jason Lewis and colleagues, who have remeasured Morton's skulls and revisited the data analysis issues. Their findings have surprised everyone. First, consider the database. Gould did not measure any of the skulls and concentrated his fire on the analysis. However, he did claim that Morton had mismeasured his specimens. To test this, Lewis et al. remeasured 308 of the 670 skulls in Morton's collection. Using their measurements as the standard for comparison, they found that seven of the racial groups were mismeasured by more than 5%. However, they found no correlation of these mismeasurements with Moreton's a priori biases. Therefore, they have concluded that Gould was wrong to make the claims he did about measurement bias. Note these comments from their paper and remember that Gould made no measurements himself to check:

"Gould famously suggested that Morton's measurements may have been subject to bias: "Plausible scenarios are easy to construct. Morton, measuring by seed, picks up a threateningly large black skull, fills it lightly and gives it a few desultory shakes. Next, he takes a distressingly small Caucasian skull, shakes hard, and pushes mightily at the foramen magnum with his thumb. It is easily done, without conscious motivation; expectation is a powerful guide to action"."

Next, Lewis et al. address the analysis of the data. Gould came to the conclusion that there were no differences to speak of among Morton's races and the claimed differences were explained as the misuse of various statistical strategies. The details need not concern us here. Lewis et al. summarise this part of their research as follows: "Our analysis of Gould's claims reveals that most of Gould's criticisms are poorly supported or falsified." Furthermore, they note: "It is doubtful that Morton equated cranial capacity and intelligence, calling into question his motivation for manipulating capacity averages." They conclude that Gould himself provides the better example of developing research to match a personal bias.
"Of the substantive criticisms Gould made of Morton's work, only two are supported here. First, Morton indeed believed in the concept of race and assigned a plethora of different attributes to various groups, often in highly racist fashion. This, however, is readily apparent to anyone reading the opening pages of Morton's Crania Americana. Second, the summary table of Morton's final 1849 catalog has multiple errors. However, had Morton not made those errors his results would have more closely matched his presumed a priori bias. Ironically, Gould's own analysis of Morton is likely the stronger example of a bias influencing results."

Such radical outcomes of this work has raised ripples of astonishment among interested scientists and educators. There are strong words coming from the anthropologist John Hawks' blog:

"Anyway, you can see why I find this outrageous. Gould used the well-documented work of a long-dead man to make an argument that unconscious bias is widespread in science. He posed as a concerned critic, but thereby cast doubt on the validity of the scientific enterprise. He picked volume measurement and tabulation of averages as his target, making it seem as if the simplest and most objective observations - the Junior High-level science methods - were themselves subject to all-encompassing cultural biases. His paper and book are very widely read and cited by people who will never examine the primary evidence. Gould owed us a responsible reading and trustworthy reporting on that evidence. In its place, he made up fictional stories, never directly examined the evidence himself, and misreported Morton's numbers."

The paradox for me is that I regard Gould as having exposed the superficiality of Darwinian "just so" adaptationist stories, yet here he is guilty of the same deed - constructing a just-so story about Morton measuring his skulls. I regarded Gould as injecting some interesting statistical ideas to historical science, and yet here he is, manipulating data to make it conform to an expected outcome. The basic lesson about cultural bias intruding into science is undiminished - but the case study subject is now Stephen Jay Gould, not Samuel George Morton. And if Gould illustrates the problem, questions about the cultural bias of any contemporary scientific writerwriter is legitimate and should be encouraged. John Hawks concludes thus:

"The new paper is open access, and I think that everyone should read it. The text is easy to follow, and the authors include clear answers to common questions about Morton's work and beliefs. It is a very suitable article for assignment in classes. They note that the basic issue here (endocranial volume of different groups) is largely explained by ecogeography - the authors mention climate explicitly, but I would add body size and life history as parameters that covary with climate. Measurement of endocranial volume was cutting edge science in 1840, but I repeat, this is simple stuff."

The Mismeasure of Science: Stephen Jay Gould versus Samuel George Morton on Skulls and Bias
Jason E. Lewis, David DeGusta, Marc R. Meyer, Janet M. Monge, Alan E. Mann, Ralph L. Holloway
PLoS Biology, 9(6): e1001071 | doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001071

First paragraph: Stephen Jay Gould, the prominent evolutionary biologist and science historian, argued that "unconscious manipulation of data may be a scientific norm" because "scientists are human beings rooted in cultural contexts, not automatons directed toward external truth", a view now popular in social studies of science. In support of his argument Gould presented the case of Samuel George Morton, a 19th-century physician and physical anthropologist famous for his measurements of human skulls. Morton was considered the objectivist of his era, but Gould reanalyzed Morton's data and in his prize-winning book The Mismeasure of Man argued that Morton skewed his data to fit his preconceptions about human variation. Morton is now viewed as a canonical example of scientific misconduct. But did Morton really fudge his data? Are studies of human variation inevitably biased, as per Gould, or are objective accounts attainable, as Morton attempted? We investigated these questions by remeasuring Morton's skulls and reexamining both Morton's and Gould's analyses. Our results resolve this historical controversy, demonstrating that Morton did not manipulate data to support his preconceptions, contra Gould. In fact, the Morton case provides an example of how the scientific method can shield results from cultural biases.

See also:

Gould, S.J. Morton's Ranking of Races by Cranial Capacity, Science, 5 May 1978, 200, 503-509.

Hawks, J. Gould's "Unconscious Manipulation of Data", John Hawks Weblog (8 June 2011)

Post-script: an Editorial in Nature comments on the research paper and concludes with the paragraph below. Here is another indication that the peer review process as presently practiced is making it more difficult to publish unorthodox or potentially controversial ideas. Can this be good for science?
"Just as important is the readiness of the scientific community to undertake such studies, and to see them through the sometimes difficult publication process. The criticism of Gould was rejected by the journal Current Anthropology, and spent eight months in the review process at PLoS Biology. And although an undergraduate did publish a more modest study scrutinizing Gould in 1988, it is remarkable that it has taken more than 30 years for a research group to check Gould's claims thoroughly. Did Gould's compelling writing and admirable anti-racist motivations help to delay scrutiny of his facts? Quite possibly, and this is regrettable. Although future historians will be happy to scrutinize our most persuasive and celebrated luminaries, today's scientists should not leave the job to them." (Mismeasure for mismeasure, Nature, 474, 419 (23 June 2011)

Two interesting papers contribute significantly to our understanding of science education debates. The first, by Joachim Allgaier, considers newspaper accounts of a UK school (Emmanuel College) that was accused of teaching creationism in science classes. The goal of the study was to find out what sources journalists used, and how the sources of education journalists compares with the sources used by science journalists. The issue is important because of the potential for media accounts of issues like this to mould public opinion and shape responses. The two types of journalists can be distinguished in a broad-brush way:

"Science journalists, for instance, visit scientific conferences, talks and presentations, read and follow scientific journals and receive 'embargoed' press releases from scientific institutions and pre-published articles from science journals. Journalists specialising in stories about education follow the news coverage on education on various media channels, keep in touch with teachers, head teachers and other professionals from the education world, and follow the moves of teaching unions, representatives of the government and education authorities."

Science journalism has its challenges (source here)

The Emmanuel College case study was selected because it was given considerable media coverage and a total of 111 news reports were analysed. This was supplemented by qualitative interviews with a sub-set of reporters covering the story. Very quickly, differences started to emerge. Education reporters sought out informants close to the action: the head-teacher, staff - particularly science teachers, local teaching union, local education committees, pupils and their parents. On the national scale, the views of OFSTEAD were relevant (their assessment of the school was positive), the fact that the Prime Minister supported the school, and representatives of the relevant government department were consulted. The greatest credibility was associated with teachers and educators with long teaching experience. By contrast, the science correspondent in the sample majored on secondary sources: scientists and education policy makers. According to this journalist, most were hostile to the idea of teaching creationism.

"The science correspondent's approach therefore appears less proactive than that of the education correspondents, who directly searched out their contacts at the school. The science correspondent only indirectly referenced the school, when he quoted from the Emmanuel College prospectus (available online), suggesting that creationism is taught in science classes. To justify this indirect approach, he stated, 'the school itself wasn't talking'. This account is in stark contrast to the experience of three education correspondents all of whom commented that representatives and the staff at Emmanuel College were very open towards journalists and also employed PR experts to get their view across. They reported that access to the school was granted to all education correspondents that wanted to visit it."

These findings raise questions about balanced reporting - what is balanced? What is objective? The research has shown that different journalists have different views on objectivity. In particular, the science journalist made a value judgment that prioritised the consensus from the science community that creationism in any form was bad for education.

"The journalistic norm of balanced reporting can have consequences not only for controversies amongst scientists but also when there is consensus amongst the scientific community (e.g., that the theory of evolution is a scientific theory and creationist explanations are not scientific ones) and scientific knowledge is attacked from outside the scientific community. However, there were different notions of legitimacy held by correspondents with regard to the Emmanuel College case that informed them about what was objective or not. Put another way, correspondents with different professional and personal ideals assess the representation of sources and the coverage of the debate in different ways."

Whilst this is a single case study, it does raise issues that warrant further research and reflection. To promote reflective thought on the findings, Michael Reiss contributed a paper with the title "Teachers as Journalists?". There is an analogy to be made:

"In this commentary I would like to use Joachim Allgaier's paper as a springboard that allows me to examine some of the similarities and differences between the work of the journalists he studied and that of science teachers who have, day in and day out, like journalists, though to a lesser extent, to make decisions about how to react to and deal with new issues of topic interest. Like journalists, teachers operate under considerable time pressures and have preferred sources. They are also accountable, though to different bodies."

Reiss points out that teachers in the UK have always been used to a degree of freedom in the way they select and present issues. They have also been encouraged to make links between their classroom teaching and developments in society that will increase the relevance of the content matter and catch the imagination of students. Just as journalists cover the creation-evolution issue because they think there is a interest from their readers, so also teachers might wish to incorporate science-religion questions into their lessons. There appear to be four possible options for science teachers:

* There is a requirement in a particular science course to address the issue
* Science teachers are free to decide whether or not to raise the issue with their students
* Science teachers only choose whether or not to address the issue if it is brought up by their students
* Science teachers do not address the issue under any circumstances.

The first must be ruled out because some science teachers will not want to do this and constraining teachers to do something they are not committed to is not the way education works. The fourth option also constrains teachers - this time not to address the issue. Reiss says this "seems unduly restrictive". His reason? -

"After all creationists make empirical claims about the world (notably that not all organisms share common ancestors and, in creationist Christianity and Judaism, though not in creationist Islam, that the world is much younger than deduced by science). Are we really saying that such claims lay outwith the compass of science?"

So this leaves the second and third possibilities, giving teachers the choice as to how these issues will be addressed, if at all. This brings Reiss to the topic of how teachers should deal with the issue. Should they be like education reporters, who make an attempt to be balanced by talking to people on all sides and producing a report where their sources can recognise their positions being portrayed fairly? Or should teachers be like the science reporter, who wanted to bring out the scientific consensus position. Reiss refers to the "Teach the controversy" approach in the US and explains why some teachers do not want to go down that pathway.

Finally, Reiss considers outcomes. What are the deliverables? - the learning outcomes? From practical experience, Reiss thinks it is more important to have outcomes that promote use of the scientific method and critical reasoning than it is to have students signing up to a consensus position.

"It is, I hold, the job of science teachers to strive to communicate this scientific understanding to their students, not for the students necessarily to accept it but for them to understand it. [. . .] The job of a science teacher is therefore to present a very particular way of understanding the world."

These thoughts are highly relevant to contemporary developments in the UK and in the US. There are many very vocal people wanting to require teachers to handle these issues in a particular way - enforcing the consensus. For some of us, this is very worrying and it should be worrying to the teaching profession. This is a move towards totalitarian control, and that always ends up damaging real education, because the focus is not on critical thought but on conformance to an externally imposed norm. This is an issue where the students should come first, and this is an issue where Michael Reiss has some really valuable advice for us all. (For more on Reiss' approach, go here).

Who is having a voice? Journalists' selection of sources in a creationism controversy in the UK press
Joachim Allgaier
Cultural Studies of Science Education, 2011, 6(2), 445-467 | DOI: 10.1007/s11422-011-9319-5

Abstract: Media accounts of reality have the potential to influence public opinion and decision making processes. Therefore who has and who does not have access to the media and can make their voice heard is a crucial question with serious political consequences. In this article it is investigated whether the speciality of journalists influences their source selection procedures. The coverage of science in schools is an interesting example, since it can be covered by specialized science or education correspondents, but also by general news reporters. A public controversy in the UK about the inclusion of creationism in a school is used to identify which types of sources were selected by various journalists. The focus is upon the selection of sources and whether journalists with different specialties consider various sources relevant and credible. A content analysis of articles, featuring this controversy, is combined with an analysis of correspondent's strategies for selecting sources based on interviews with them. The findings suggest that compared to journalists that specialize in education issues, science correspondents employ a narrower scope when seeking sources. This might have important consequences for the representation of views on science education in the media.

Teachers as journalists?
Michael J. Reiss
Cultural Studies in Science Education,2011, 6(2), 469-473 | DOI: 10.1007/s11422-011-9322-x

Abstract: I start by considering some of the similarities between journalists and science teachers in their work and then go on to examine three questions that are of importance in dealing with creationism in schools: Is the issue one that is worth dealing with? How might one deal with it? What does one hope to achieve by dealing with it? I conclude that (i) it is worth science teachers dealing with the issue of creationism in schools but only if they wish to; (ii) science teachers should not give the impression that the theory of evolution is scientifically controversial; (iii) while one is very unlikely to change the mind, as a result of school teaching, of someone who does not, on religious grounds, accept the theory of evolution, it is very worth presenting the scientific account of the theory and enabling students to review the evidence for it.