Science Literature

When I took a course leading to the Certificate of Higher Education, we had some lecture inputs on psychology. The rationale was to show how educational strategies can be informed by the findings of psychologists. My abiding memory of these lectures concern the way the thinking of Sigmund Freud was presented: I was astounded that the lecturer was so uncritical of Freundianism. It was as though the great man was an oracle and we were expected to absorb his words rather than appraise them. At the time of taking the course, I was aware that Freud was no scientist. He did not test out his ideas using an experimental approach. Rather, he used his ideology-based theory as a filter through which to interpret the data. It was a useful experience for me - reinforcing the distinction between ideology and empirically based science.

In view of this, I welcomed reading the concerns expressed in an editorial in the current Nature. The opening paragraph reads:

"Anyone reading Sigmund Freud's original works might well be seduced by the beauty of his prose, the elegance of his arguments and the acuity of his intuition. But those with a grounding in science will also be shocked by the abandon with which he elaborated his theories on the basis of essentially no empirical evidence. This is one of the main reasons why Freudian-style psychoanalysis has long since fallen out of fashion: its huge expense - treatment can stretch over years - is not balanced by evidence of efficacy."

Disillusionment with Freud has not led to a better understanding of humanity (source here)

The stimulus for the editorial was a report issued by a report into the current status and future prospects of clinical psychology in the US. This found that a very high proportion of practitioners put more emphasis on their personal experience than on scientific evidence. This leads to a situation where craft practices prevail and interest in science is low. The US is not alone with these problems: go here and here.

"[M]any psychologists continue to use unproven therapies that have no clear outcome measures - including, in extreme cases, such highly suspect regimens as 'dolphin-assisted therapy'."

Questions are raised in the Editorial about the educational programmes leading to professional qualifications. The American Psychological Association is the accrediting body for the United States and Canada. However:

"The APA requires that such courses have a scientific component, but it does not require that science be as central as some members would like. In frustration, representatives of some two-dozen top research-focused graduate-training programmes grouped together in 1994 to form the Academy of Psychological Clinical Science (APCS), with a mission to promote scientific psychology."

The Editorial points out the scientific advances that could support clinical psychology: neuroimaging, molecular and behavioural genetics, and cognitive neuroscience. However, the link between the science and clinical practice is not explained, and it is worth asking whether the lukewarmness of practitioners towards science is because they have not been able to translate the science into therapeutic interventions. These practitioners are pragmatists: they are looking for therapies that they can use. They will not need to be brow-beaten into using scientific psychology if the findings are relevant to their profession.

Without wishing to denigrate in any way the empirical work being done in science laboratories, there is a problem with the theoretical framework adopted by most researchers. Here is one psychologist writing about free-will and his perception of science:

"[T]here can be no such thing as free will for the committed scientist, in his or her professional life. Thus, science itself presupposes that every phenomenon has a cause. We may speak of "spontaneous combustion" or a "spontaneous abortion" or even "spontaneous applause", but in each of these cases, some cause is more than likely . . . it is essential to a sober, naturalistic worldview." (Source here)

In this quote, the writer says that "science itself presupposes that every phenomenon has a cause", but he means that every phenomenon has a natural cause. He refers to a naturalistic worldview. Now this is a real problem. Instead of science being a search for truth, the writer is using science to pre-empt discussion about causation. But what if there are intelligent causes as well as natural ones? How would naturalistic science ever know? The author quotes Daniel Dennett approvingly:

"By trying to answer the questions, by sketching out the non-miraculous paths that can take us all the way from senseless atoms to freely chosen actions, we open up handholds for the imagination. The compatibility of free will and science . . . is not as inconceivable as it once seemed."

The issue is not one of introducing the miraculous to science (which is an impossible scenario) but insisting that there is continuity from senseless atoms to conscious humanity. By excluding intelligent causation, naturalistic science is making a statement about the nature of reality. The assertion does not emerge by the use of the scientific method, but is a dogmatic imposition. Unfortunately, this materialistic mindset is widespread among behavioural geneticists and neuroscientists. If their philosophical stance is wrong, and there are no checks and balances in their science, then they will never understand the human condition. This does not give confidence that their work will lead to therapeutic interventions that will help patients.

This is not to defend "unproven therapies" but to flag up a problem not mentioned in the Editorial. Freud imposed theory onto data, but so also does naturalistic science. We need to be encouraging a science that is free to explore the evidence wherever it leads and which builds into its methodologies the means to challenge its most cherished presuppositions.

Current Status and Future Prospects of Clinical Psychology
Timothy B. Baker, Richard M. McFall, and Varda Shoham.
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 9(2), November 2008, 67-103.

Excerpt from Summary: Clinical psychologists' failure to achieve a more significant impact on clinical and public health may be traced to their deep ambivalence about the role of science and their lack of adequate science training, which leads them to value personal clinical experience over research evidence, use assessment practices that have dubious psychometric support, and not use the interventions for which there is the strongest evidence of efficacy. Clinical psychology resembles medicine at a point in its history when practitioners were operating in a largely prescientific manner.

Psychology: a reality check
Editorial
Nature 461, 847 (15 October 2009) | doi:10.1038/461847a

Abstract: If clinical psychology in the United States wants to remain viable and relevant in today's health systems, it needs to publicly embrace science.

For more blogs on the nature of humanity, go here, here and here.