Literature

Discussions of ID and related topics are often characterised by the word 'polarised'. Stereotyped thinking is widespread and there is often a lack of any real engagement with the issues. It is a pleasure, therefore, to find a thoughtful contribution that stands back from the confrontational stance.

"As a philosopher of science, I am mainly interested in the arguments. At the end of the day, do we need an explanation for the fine-tuning of the cosmos? If so, what is the best explanation? Likewise for the origin of life on Earth and its evolution over time; what are the competing explanations and how do we assess them? These are questions that can be discussed at a scholarly level. The purpose of this essay is to push that discussion along just a bit."

"Surrounded by sophists, we are left without a Socrates" - Jeffrey Koperski

Koperski considers four arguments against ID, two of which are flawed and deserve to be refuted. The other two have some value for meaningful discourse. These arguments are highlighted below, together with Koperski's evaluation of them. The additional thoughts are mine.

The first flawed argument concerns the way ID is regarded as a Trojan horse, "sneaking good old-fashioned creation science past the censors". This is the message conveyed by the label "Intelligent Design Creationism". Koperski's evaluation is clear enough:

"In my view, labeling those who doubt the efficacy of genetic mutation and natural selection "creationists" is a rhetorical strategy, what some logic texts call "stereotyping". Cable television provides ready exemplars for both the creationist stereotype and its cousin, the fundamentalist. Critics try to shape the debate by connecting ID to these templates. If successful, little work needs to be done. The labels tell us who represents the side of rationality over and against the side of ignorance. Having sorted us and them, what they actually say matters little, whoever they happen to be. We must recognize that although this is a common argumentative strategy in talk radio and presidential politics, it is not itself a logical critique. Placing the black hat on one's opponent is no substitute for an argument."

The second flawed argument is that "ID posits a nonphysical intelligence, it violates MN [methodological naturalism] and is therefore not science". This argument essentially defines the problem away. It is as though ID can be dismissed on philosophical grounds without considering any other arguments. Here is Koperski again:

"The bottom line is this: The future use or suspension of MN depends on what is discovered. If the best explanation for some new phenomenon is design, even supernatural design, it would still count as a scientific explanation. It borders on academic incompetence to pretend that science has strict boundaries and then gerrymander those boundaries to keep out the riffraff. Philosophers of science in particular should know better."

In this section, Koperski deals with the charge that ID is a science-stopper:

"Let us consider an objection. Some argue that design explanations would hamper the progress of science. Because "God did it" is potentially an answer to any Why question, allowing design back into biology is a science stopper. If divine fiat is an acceptable explanation, why push on with difficult and expensive research? [. . .] I think this is a plausible objection. If one already has an answer to a question, why search for another? The only thing I ask is that we hold this claim up against the history of science in order to test it. [. . .] As far as I can tell, "God did it" is simply not an answer that theists reach for whenever research bogs down."

Significantly, both of these flawed arguments played a significant role in the Kitzmiller v. Dover 2005 trial. Judge Jones would do well to read what Koperski has to say about this. His words are sufficient to show that the legal judgment was flawed.

"We have examined two bad arguments used against ID. Both are rhetorically effective, persuading teachers and judges alike, and I fully expect to see them in the future. My appeal to those in the academy is this: Let us not use bad arguments as a means to an end."

So, we move on to consider two grounds for properly criticising ID. Allowing that it can contribute to science, is ID demonstrating good science? Some ID science focuses on the problems for evolutionary theory, and neo-Darwinism in particular. These contributions point out examples of irreducible complexity and complex specified information. Without going into details, Koperski considers the responses that have been made to these arguments sufficient to show that neo-Darwinism is still alive and well. "In other words, there are many soft anomalies in the literature but no hard ones."

"The second kind of ID science includes research that fits nicely within a design framework, even though the researchers themselves do not support ID. For example, ID proponents often speak favorably of research showing that so-called junk DNA actually is functional. The idea is that one should expect more purpose in biological structures than would be expected from a Darwinian point of view. The nanotechnology approach to microscopic systems is also considered very ID-friendly. The reason scientists find such utility in thinking of biological systems as machines is because, in some sense, that is what they are. The conceptual link with human artifacts is not merely a metaphor. These kinds of ID-related science are well and good, as far as they go. What critics rightly clamor for, however, is peer-reviewed research in which design has more than a mere heuristic role."

Certainly, both these aspects of ID science feature in this blog and many other ID writings. Basically, we are ready to accept Koperski's challenge and engage further on these matters - but we do ask that this be conducted within the science community. The evidence to date is that science journals and science conferences are willing to discuss these issues as long as ID advocates are excluded from having a voice. This is not an acceptable way to conduct this debate. Furthermore, Koperski is too willing to accept the peer-review argument. All the evidence to date is that editors publishing an overt ID paper are deemed to have failed in their duty to the science community and are therefore incompetent. Koperski writes: "Some think of ID primarily as a weapon in the culture wars. Anti-design bias in the academy is part of the backlash. Had ID consistently emphasized research over public exposure, the atmosphere of the debate would be different today." But this argument presupposes that the culture war is an ID invention! If there really is a culture war, no amount of ID research will satisfy the critics! For more on this, go here.

The second "good" argument against ID is that it is more radical than necessary. Koperski refers to the conservatism of science and the preference for incremental change.

"Even if orthodox neo-Darwinism collapses, design obviously is not the only alternative. More important, the rivals are more conservative vis a vis the reigning theory. They do not challenge MN. In fact, very little would have to be added to textbook evolutionary theory if one or more of these is accepted. If any one of them is capable of resolving the problems posed by complex structures and macroevolution, ID is a more radical solution than is needed. In short, if scientific conservatism is a defensible, normative principle of theory change, it undermines the acceptability of ID."

The problem with this analysis is that it has no sense of history. The pioneers of science were ID advocates. Science was born and nurtured with the legitimacy of making design inferences. The trends over the centuries have been towards secularisation and achieving this in biology was Darwin's achievement. This is why the secularists are so keen to make Darwin's bicentennial a success. The issue is not conservatism, but metaphysics. For some of us, the issue is one of science reconnecting with its roots.

Two Bad Ways to Attack Intelligent Design and Two Good Ones
Jeffrey Koperski
Zygon, 43 (2), June 2008, pages 433-449

Abstract: Four arguments are examined in order to assess the state of the Intelligent Design debate. First, critics continually cite the fact that ID proponents have religious motivations. When used as criticism of ID arguments, this is an obvious ad hominem. Nonetheless, philosophers and scientists alike continue to wield such arguments for their rhetorical value. Second, in his expert testimony in the Dover trial, philosopher Robert Pennock used repudiated claims in order to brand ID as a kind of pseudoscience. His arguments hinge on the nature of methodological naturalism as a metatheoretic shaping principle. We examine the use of such principles in science and the history of science. Special attention is given to the demarcation problem. Third, the scientific merits of ID are examined. Critics rightly demand more than promissory notes for ID to move beyond the fringe. Fourth, although methodological naturalism gets a lot of attention, there is another shaping principle to contend with, namely, conservatism. Science, like most disciplines, tends to change in an incremental rather than revolutionary manner. When ID is compared to other non- or quasi-Darwinian proposals, it appears to be a more radical solution than is needed in the face of the anomalies.