ABSTRACTS OF PLENARY SPEAKERS

IN ORDER OF PRESENTATION

OPENING DEBATE 7:15-9:15pm: Is Design a Good Idea for Science?

In my talk I will argue that the theory of intelligent design is good for science because it explains features of living systems better than purely naturalistic types of explanations. Specifically, I will seek to show that intelligent design best explains the origin of the information necessary to build a living cell. I will also intimate (but not demonstrate here) that the theory of intelligent design can have a positive heuristic value for the biological sciences.

In my debate with Stephen Meyer about evolution and intelligent design I intend to show the consilience of inductions, or convergence of evidence from nature points unquestionably to a process of evolution that is not designed by any intelligent force outside of the laws of nature as we understand them through science. If nature represents the product of an intelligent designer, She isn't all that smart. Finally, I will demonstrate that the belief that the findings of science just happen to coincide with one particular religious faith to the exclusion of the thousands of others in the world is both exclusionary and untenable. Intelligent design is just repackaged natural theology debunked by Darwin nearly a century and a half ago.

PLENARY SESSION 8:00-10:00am: Design in the Biological Sciences

Several counterexamples proffered by scientific critics of a theory of intelligent design in biochemistry will themselves be critiqued, and the question of the falsifiabilities of intelligent design and Darwinism will be explored.

The bacterial flagellum is a complex organelle comprised of ca. 30 structural proteins. To synthesize this organelle and integrate its function with the sensory apparatus of the cell requires over 50 genes. Flagellar basal body complexes house a 'true' rotory engine, which can display rotation speeds up to 100,000 rpm. Analysis of flagellum assembly shows that it is synthesized from the inner-membrane to the external environment. This reflects a programmed order of gene expression to ensure the proper proteins and the correct amount are made congruently. Assembly involves a dedicated protein secretory apparatus that directs components in an ordered fashion to the assembly sites. Check points in assembly feedback to regulate gene expression. As such, the flagellum is an elegant machine. Because each gene is required for proper cell motility, it is a good paradigm for irreducible complexity.

Michael Behe's "Biochemical Challenge to Evolution" rests on the premise that biochemical systems possess "irreducible complexity" and therefore could not be the products of natural selection. The premise of this argument is false and its conclusion is in error. In fact, portions of the very systems advanced as examples of irreducible complexity can be shown to have important functions, explaining how natural selection could, and in many cases, did produce the complex biochemical machinery of the cell. The claims of "design" advocates that the scientific literature lacks Darwinian accounts of the evolution of such systems are likewise incorrect.

PLENARY SESSION 10:30am-12:30pm: Design in the Physical Sciences

The strengths of physical forces, the masses of elementary particles, and other features of our universe, seem "fine tuned" in ways favouring the evolution of intelligent life. This could be attributed to divine selection. Alternatively, it might indicate observational selection. Physicists have described mechanisms that could lead to the existence of hugely many universes, very varied in their properties. Plainly, only universes with life-permitting properties could be observed by intelligent living things. I discuss why "the God hypothesis" should be preferred to any godless "multiple universes plus observational selection hypothesis". Without having to be pictured as himself an inexplicably existing, inexplicably powerful being, God could account for several puzzling matters which would otherwise be beyond explanation.

In this paper, I will build off John Leslie's paper on the fine-tuning of the cosmos as evidence for design, specifically examining whether the so-called multiple-universe hypothesis can offer a viable alternative explanation to that of design. After briefly reiterating the case for design from the fine-tuning of the cosmos for life, I will focus on the inflationary multiple-universe model as offering the most physically plausible multiple-universe scenario. Although multiple-universe models naturally arise within inflationary cosmology, in order to explain the fine-tuning using these models we need an underlying physical theory that allows for an enormous variation in the parameters, and probably the laws, of physics. I will point out that the most promising, physically viable theory that might allow for enough variation both in the parameters and lower level laws of physics is superstring theory, though it is currently too early to tell. I will then argue that even if a superstring/inflationary scenario could be constructed to explain the fine-tuning, the laws governing superstring theory itself appear to exhibit a surprising amount of design to allow for the generation of not only multiple universes, but multiple universes such that even one of them could turn out to be life-permitting. Thus, I will argue, any viable superstring/inflation multiple-universe scenario is likely simply to move the problem of design up one level (though in an attenuated form) to the superstring/inflationary multiple-universe scenario itself.

In the second part of the paper, I will focus on several aspects of the laws of nature, namely, their simplicity, beauty, and intelligibility-- that both suggest design and at the same time cannot be explained by any multiple-universe hypothesis. I will then argue that these features of the laws of nature give us significant reasons to prefer design over the multiple-universe hypothesis as an explanation of the fine-tuning and other aspects structure of the universe. Throughout, I will attempt to be as concrete and rigorous as possible given the time constraints: for example., I intend to provide several specific examples of the simplicity, beauty, and intelligibility of the laws of nature and why they suggest design.

Brian Josephson. When Can We Infer Design?

Dembski suggests that if the SETI project were to observe a signal encoding the primes from 2 to 101 that would be an indication of intelligent design. But such an argument seems also to assign design to the spectrum of hydrogen, also a complex entity fitting a particular specification to a high degree.

More seems to be needed. An alternative situation to consider is a complex object that serves a purpose, such as a watch or a mobile phone. Here the specification of the object is its capacity to perform the particular purpose, in the particular context, and simple physical laws seem unlikely to provide an explanation for this. However, some such cases can be accounted for by natural selection, progressively favouring structures which conform to some selection criterion.

The computations involved in determining whether or not random changes combined with natural selection could plausibly have evolved beings such as ourselves through some sequence of evolutionary steps could have evolved seem too complex to allow any definite conclusions to be arrived at. Certain paranormal phenomena or religious experiences may offer better evidence of 'design' of a non-materialistic nature.

LUNCH PRESENTATION:

Jean Staune. Jean Staune will present a synthesis of European work on non-Darwinian approaches to science.

SPECIAL CO-PRESENTATION 1:30-2:30pm:

Walter Starkey. Intelligent Design as Viewed by a Professional Machine Designer.

Walter Starkey, a Professor of Engineering with a life-time of experience in Machine Design and an expert witness, will set out his reasons for believing in intelligent design.

Lawrence Starkey. Philosophical Reflections on Intelligent Design.

Walter’s brother, Lawrence, a professional philosopher, will add his insights to the presentation.

PLENARY SESSION 4:00-6:00pm: Design in the Public School

David DeWolf & Stephen Meyer.

As skepticism has grown about the adequacy of neo-Darwinism as a scientific account for the origin of living things, the question has arisen as to what, if anything, of this debate should be presented to high school students. In our "briefing book" for school boards and school administrators, we make the case for "teaching the controversy" as a preferable alternative to a presentation that assumes that neo-Darwinism has definitively solved the problem. Not only is it constitutional to present alternative scientific theories such as intelligent design, but it makes for much more effective pedagogy that teaches our students about the role of dissent and controversy in the advancement of science.

If students are to be liberally educated (rather than trained or socialized) they must learn to think critically. When interpretations of the subjects they study are controversial, and the implications are important, students must be taught something about the contending positions. Because the relationships of science to philosophical naturalism and to theology are matters of scholarly and cultural controversy and importance, there are strong educational reasons for including some discussion of intelligent design theory in the science curriculum. I will buttress my argument with a general account of the interdisciplinary nature of a good liberal education--one that takes seriously both secular and religious ways of making sense of the world.

Ronald Numbers.

Although debates over the teaching of evolution in the public schools of America date back to the early twentieth century, so-called intelligent design did not become a significant educational issue until the late 1980s, when Dean H. Kenyon and Percival Davis brought out their text, Of Pandas and People: The Central Question of Biological Origins (1989). Few school districts adopted this work, but it touched off a continuing debate over whether intelligent design cleared the constitutional hurdles placed in the way of teaching creationism. This paper explores the parallels between the experiences with creationism and intelligent design and places the arguments for and against the teaching of intelligent design in historical context.

CONFERENCE BANQUET Banquet Speaker: Diogenes Allen.

In the Bible the basis of belief in God is not the natural world. This fact is often overlooked in the philosophy of religion and theology and science discussions, which seek to determine whether a rational belief in God is warranted by the natural world. This leads to the neglect of many of the actual reasons people believe in God, and a failure to understand the actual weight given to the natural world in religious belief. As a result, it is often thought that as long as God is not required to explain nature, then there is no proper reason to believe in God.

PLENARY SESSION 8:00-10:00am: How to Detect Design

The problem to be faced in this paper is that of detecting design, and in particular when is it legitimate to suggest that there was a design, or indeed had to be a designer and when should one pull back and ascribe other causes. I take it that first of all one has the issue of why one might even think about wanting to talk about design. To take Paley’s example, if for instance, one is walking through a desert one comes across a watch at least one starts to think in terms of design. Whereas if one just comes across a rock presumably one does not, so the first matter is why one would even start to talk in terms of design. Then secondly if once one has decided that one has an object or situation where a design argument or inference would be appropriate one has then the question of deciding whether or not it is proper to infer design. I take it that there are at least three possibilities here which are not necessarily exclusive. First one might want to argue that there is literal design in the sense that humans had designed it. Secondly one might want to argue that there is the appearance of design, but that one can explain it through natural causes and then third presumably there is the question of some sort of intervention from outside. I take it that one has to discuss which of these hypotheses is going to be the more reasonable to go with at the beginning, and whether or not one can ever go for the intervention from outside. Finally, I want to discuss this in the context of biology, and make some remarks on how one ought to deal with such things as organic adaptations.

I will maintain (and argue in varying degrees of detail for) the following:

i. that the concept of design (even supernatural design) is in principle legitimate as a descriptive and/or explanatory conceptual resource in some natural scientific contexts. Here I side with Dembski and design advocates against critics (although I differ with many design advocates concerning how powerful their present cases actually are).

ii. that Dembski's system as developed in The Design Inference is liable to a number of significant criticisms, and further that it is incomplete in a way which renders it inapplicable in some of the most important historical design cases

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iii that Dembski's system, even if correct, would have only limited practical applicability in most design disputes.

My conclusion is that although there is much of positive value in The Design Inference, the case is less powerful than most of Dembski's supporters appear to believe.

William Dembski. Why Natural Selection Can't Design Anything.

In his most recent book, The Fifth Miracle, Paul Davies remarks that life is not mysterious for its complexity per se, but for its tightly specified complexity. Specified complexity is a type of information, and its explanation is increasingly regarded as the new holy grail of science. The problem, as much of the scientific community sees it, is to get a modicum of specified complexity to emerge in some initial replicator (cf. for instance Manfred Eigen's hypercycles or Stuart Kauffman's autocatalytic sets). Once a self-replicating system is in place, the Darwinian selection mechanism is said to take over and generate increasing degrees of specified complexity. But on closer investigation it becomes clear that natural selection can do nothing of the sort. Indeed, recent work on "No Free Lunch" theorems shows that any specified complexity that a Darwinian mechanism outputs had first

to be inputted apart from the Darwinian mechanism. Darwin's theory therefore fails to refute the claim by design theorists that the only cause sufficient to account for specified complexity is intelligence.

PLENARY SESSION 10:15am-12:15pm: Design's Philosophical Bona Fides

Patrick Henry Reardon.

The current discussions among empirical scientists and "intelligent design" theorists are excessively burdened with confusions that are spawned, on both sides, by apologetic preoccupations. Apologists among the empirical scientists have not, on occasion, shown sufficient discernment with respect to the greatly differing motivation of their critics. Intelligent Design theorists sometimes fail to distinguish adequately between theology and philosophical apologetics. What is chiefly needed in this discussion is greater attention to a more ample Philosophy of Science, especially the restoration of the latter into the larger philosophical pursuit, particularly Metaphysics. The study of human language appears to offer a useful avenue toward beginning this much needed restoration.

In his recent book, "Intelligent Design," William Dembski argues that, "[i]t is the empirical detectability of intelligent causes that renders intelligent design a fully scientific theory and distinguishes it from the design arguments of philosophers…." [107] Thus, according to Dembski, it follows that Christians ought to jettison their commitment to methodological naturalism. In my presentation I will argue that Dembski's design inference is not a fully scientific theory and so does not present any particular threat to methodological naturalism. This analysis will provide the occasion for examining those features that do in fact support the inference to intelligent design. I maintain that these considerations, and so ID, are best regarded as falling outside the purview of scientific inquiry.

Michael Roberts. Rocks, Religion, Rhetoric and the two Creations in Design.

ID often claims or is alleged to be a restatement of the Design Argument of the 18th and 19th Centuries. This paper begins to compare ID with its apparent historical precursors. It is my contention that Design cannot be considered in isolation but must be seen in relationship to other ideas. Above all it must be considered historically.

ROCKS

The development of geological time from 1650 to 1860 and the implications for Design is considered, especially the number of Creative acts required. And then the implication of geological time for Intelligent Design.

RELIGION

Theistic science and "libertarian acts of God" are considered against history especially the Flood and appearance of life from Ray to Buckland assessing what was naturalistic and what "theistic". From thence Darwin’s "Ordinary View of Creation" and post-Darwinian religious Darwinism.

RHETORIC

The (ambivalent) use of rhetoric in design considered in Ray, Paley and Buckland, then Darwin and then Dawkins and Dembski.

TWO LEVELS OF CREATION?

Whether ID ends up with a split level creation, one explained by MN and the other by TS. This is related to pre-Darwinian outlooks and Darwin’s "Ordinary View of Creation".

CONCLUSION

ID has certain similarities and continuities with older Design but also some significant differences. It also tends to overlook the rise of the historical sciences such as geology. To pose a question; Is Geology a universal acid against ID?

PLENARY SESSION 1:00pm-2:00pm: Behe and his Critics

In Darwin's Black Box Michael Behe seeks to revive Paley's argument for design. Behe bases his argument on the ordered complexity of biochemical systems such as those responsible for vision, blood clotting, and so on. This is in contrast to Paley's approach which is based on the anatomy of "organs of extreme perfection." At the anatomical level, Paley's argument was defeated by Darwin's theory of evolution. Behe's first point is that at the biochemical level nobody has produced an evolutionary explanation for any complex biochemical system. Further, Behe argues, some biochemical systems have a property he calls irreducible complexity, which renders them in principle immune to Darwinian explanation. Behe is mistaken. His argument depends on the false assumption that an organism can never benefit by becoming simpler. Surprisingly, Dawkins seems to have embedded the same assumption in the central metaphor of his book Climbing Mount Improbable.

Biologists who have reviewed Michael Behe’s Darwin’s Black Box have offered at least seven criticisms. Some of these criticisms are not fair to Behe. But, on the whole, the weight of the arguments is against Behe. A fundamental flaw in the "intelligent design theory" of both Behe and William Dembski is the equivocal use of the term "intelligent design." Both Behe and Dembski speak of "intelligent design" without clearly distinguishing humanly "intelligent design" from divinely "intelligent design." We can infer the former but not the latter from common human experience.

PLENARY SESSION 4:30-6:30pm: Panel Discussion--Prospects for Design

Paul Nelson. The Wide Horizons of Design.

At its simplest, the theory of intelligent design restores to the toolkit of science a mode of explanation (intelligent causation) unjustifiably rejected in the 19^th century. While science may "ultimately...find natural causes for natural phenomena" (Miller, 1999:240), it also may not (Dembski 1999). The possibility that some phenomena are best explained by intelligent, not natural, causes, must be kept open, to allow the evidence to speak. Allowing for the possibility of intelligent causation leaves unanswered a wide range of interesting research questions, and I shall explore some of these briefly.

In many ways, Robert Boyle (1627-91) was the epitome of a natural philosopher committed to "intelligent design". He believed that the argument from design was particularly effective for convincing "atheists" of God’s existence, considered it essential to invoke intelligence as a principle of world-formation, devoted parts of several treatises to demonstrating the special value of the new experimental philosophy for enhancing our understanding of God, and endowed a lectureship dedicated to the promotion of Christianity through natural theology. At the same time, he was just as strongly committed to advance "the empire of man over the creatures" by developing a program of mechanistic science of natural causes at the level of "corpuscles". Proper explanations, he believed, need to focus on means, not agency, or they were no more than a confession of ignorance. What then would Robert Boyle have to say to Phillip Johnson? And what should we say about gods, gaps, and evidence for theism: is belief in the Christian God really equivalent to belief in Santa Claus?

Kelly Smith.

There is a new movement within the creationist camp, led by Philip

Johnson, which claims that Evolutionary theory embodies a philosophically indefensible kind of "methodological naturalism". The arguments of these new creationists are, in some ways, quite different from those we are all accustomed to seeing from traditional creationism. In fact, some of the issues they raise are thoughtful and deserve to be taken seriously. However, a critique of evolutionary theory along these lines necessarily implies a thorough-going critique of science more generally and constitutes a cure far worse than the disease it is meant to treat.

The idiom of design brings with it a presupposed distinction between that which does the designing and that which is designed. Whether the designing is being done by the invisible hand of natural selection or by the invisible hand of God, the agency of design is thus posited as lying outside of the organism. By contrast, thinkers from Aristotle to the present, invoking concepts such as epigenesis, developmental fields, autopoiesis, and the like, have attempted to address the spontaneous, creative, and adaptive features of the living organism "on its own terms." Sharing a denial of the self-organizing properties of living beings, the Dawkins and Dennetts, and the Johnsons and the Behes may hold all too much, rather than too little, in common.